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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALLEN WILLDEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, PEARL
LANCE and LEE CECIL HANSEN,

Case No
11925

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION and
LEE CECIL HANSEN

OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case arises out of the voluntary gratuitous
transportation by the Defendant, Kennecott Copper
Corporation and the driver of its ambulance, Lee Cecil
Hansen of the Plaintiff, who was injured in an accident
while employed by his employer, Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, working for Anaconda Copper Com1

pany, both of which companies had no connection with
and were not performing any duties for Kennecott Copper Corporation, and raises the question of whether the
Utah Guest Statute as found in Section 41-9-1, UCA
(1953) is applicable to prevent recovery for ordinary
negligence by the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Defendants and Respondents made a Motion
for Summary Judgment before the District Court upon
the grounds that the Utah Guest Statute barred any
claim by Plaintiff as he was a guest in Defendant's
ambulance.
After argument and the submission of briefs in
support of the respective positions of the Appellant
and Respondents, the Trial Court granted Summary
Judgment in favor of Defendants, Kennecott Copper
Corporation and Lee Cecil Hansen pursuant to a written memorandum decision by Judge Faux (R 103 and
120)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the Supreme Court
affirm the decision of the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because of the fact Appellants statement of facts
appears to be more an argument of the case and makes
2

several statements which are misleading or assumptions
which are not based upon the record, the Respondents
will set forth herein a brief statement of fact!) as
supported by the record. The Appellant, Allen Willden,
was injured while working in Bingham Canyon, Utah,
on July 7, 1965. He at that time was employed by
Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, who were a subcontractor for Anaconda Copper Corporation (R 22).
The Defendant, Kennecott Copper Corporation, had
an emergency medical station in Bingham Canyon for
the use of their own employees. When Appellant was
injured, losing the thumb on a hand, his direct superior
in Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, who also happened to be his uncle, put him in his pickup truck
and drove him to the Kennecott Copper first aid station. (Willden Depo. P 20-21). He was there voluntarily and without charge given some first aid treatment in that his hand was wrapped to stop the bleeding
and one shot of Demorol was given to reduce the pain.
That was the sole extent of the medical care undertaken by Kennecott employees and the Appellant was
thereafter loaded into Kennecott Copper Corporation's
ambulance and was in the process of being driven into
the University of Utah hospital when an accident
occurred at the intersection of 21st South and State
Street in Salt Lake City. (R 23)
The Appellant claims to have suffered a back injury
when the collision occurred and accuses the Respondents, Kennecott Copper Corporation and Lee Cecil
Hansen, of several acts of ordinary negligence. ( R
3

Appellant in his statement of facts alleges
that the driver of the Kennecott ambulance was in an
obvious weakened physical condition as a result of having worked overtime, which statement is simply a
gratuity on the part of the Appellant in that there is
not one item in the record indicating any such fact and
in addition the Appellant alleges that the Respondent
was suffering from pneumonia at the time of the trip,
which is an absolute mis-statement of fact in that the
Respondent Lee Cecil Hansen stated that he had pneumonia after he arrived at the hospital but that he wasn't
sick before. (Hansen Depo. P 26-27) . As is stated in
Appellant's brief for the purposes of the Motion of
Summary Judgment, it was stipulated that Kennecott
Copper Corporation made a practice to charge each
person who rode in the Kennecott ambulance the sum
of $7.50, but it was further stipulated that it was for
the purpose of that motion only that said stipulation
was being made and it was further stipulated that as
a matter of actual fact in this particular case the Appellant had not been charged at all and had never been
billed for any amount for the first aid service or the
transportation which fact is borne out by the record.
(R 24, R 70).
70-72).

ARGUMENT
THE GUEST STATUTE PRECLUDES RECOVERY BY THE APPELLANT FOR THE
INJURY RECEIVED 'VHILE RIDING AS A
4

GUEST OF THE RESPONDENT IN SPITE
OF ANY VOLUNTARY MEDICAL TREATMENT HE MAY HAVE RECEIVED PRIOR
TO THE COM1\1ENCEMENT OF THE TRANSPORTATION.
The Appellant argues in Point I of his brief that
the Defendant, Kennecott Copper Corporation, should
be responsible for negligence in failing to secure the
Appellant inside the ambulance because that was a
part of " . . . a continuing course of treatment . . . ".
Appellant's cite numerous cases for the proposition
that if one undertakes to act one must do so carefully. The Respondents have no quarrel with this
general statement of the law but would point out that
the apparent majority view is as set forth in 38 Am.
J ur. 688 Negligence, Sec. 42 regarding the standard
of care required of a good Samaritan as follows:
"There is authority for the view that the circumstance that one who renders service for another is acting gratuitously operates to lower the
degree of care required of him."
However, the Respondent respectfully urges that
there are at least two grounds upon which the argument of the Appellant founder. The first is that the
voluntary act of treating the injured thumb of the
Appellant came to an end at the time that the hand
was wrapped, the bleeding stopped and an injection
of Demorol given for pain. An entirely separate set
of circumstances then occurred, that being the accept5

ance by the Appellant of a ride in the vehicle of the
Respondents for the purpose of being transported to
the hospital. This placed him in the position of a guest
and the guest statute is thus applicable. Thus it can
plainly be seen that the guest _statute must of necessity
operate upon the rights of the Appellant when he is
a guest in the ambulance of Kennecott in spite of the
fact that at a previous time some first aid was rendered
to him. It would not apparently make any difference
in the operation of the guest statute as to whether the
transportation was in an ambulance with a medical technician present as well as the uncle of the Appellant
or whether the transportation had been a regular automobile owned by Kennecott and driven by one of their
employees. The first aid technician did nothing during
the course of the transportation other than talk to the
Appellant (Willden Depo. P 22-24).
The second ground upon which it must be urged
that the guest statute in fact prevents recovery by the
Appellant even under his first point of argument is
that the rule regarding ordinary care being required
of even a volunteer once a volunteer has assumed to
act is strictly common law in its origin. For this authority see the cases cited in Appellant's brief. However,
the guest statute is statutory and Appellant cites no
cases in which it is held that the requirements of the
guest statute and its exception for liability are abrogated by the common law rule upon which Appellant
relies. The rule is so commonly and widely accepted
that statutory enactments prevail over the common

6

law that the proposition needs no citation of authority
here. That being the case, the standard of care required when a person is riding as a guest in an automobile in the State of Utah is that set forth in the
guest statute. There is no allegation of wanton or
willful recklessness or misconduct on the part of the
Respondents but only allegations of normal and ordinary negligence. The stipulated facts, even assuming
normal and ordinary negligence, will not support the
position of the Appellants that the guest statute does
not operate under the circumstances of the stipulated
facts in this case.
POINT II
THE GUEST STATUTE DOES APPLY TO
AMBULANCES.
Quite contrary to the assertion of the Appellant
in his Point II, it is quite clear from examination of
Utah law that the Guest Statute does apply to a person
who is a guest within an ambulance in the State of
Utah. The clear language of Utah Guest Statute
found in Sec. 41-9-1 UCA (1953) is as follows:
"Any person who as a guest accepts a ride

in any vehicle moving upon any of the public

highways of the State of Utah, and while so
riding as such a guest receives or sustains an
injury, shall have no right of recovery against
the owner or the driver or persons responsible
for the operation of such vehicle." (Emphasis
added)

7

The language of the Statute is clear and uneqivocal
and in no way limits its application to private or non
emergency type vehicles. Appellant argues that Section
41-6-14, UCA ( 1953) governs the operation of emergency vehicles, and since (b) of this section sets out
a standard of care for emergency vehicles, it is urged
that the gue_st statute, which also establishes a standard
of care, does not apply to emergency vehicles. Respondent respectfully submits that if Appellant's logic were
to prevail here, the guest statute would have no application in any case. The entire Motor Vehicle Code
establishes a standard of care to be observed by all
motorists using the public highways. Section 41-6-14,
UCA ( 1953) is a modification of that standard as
applied to emergency vehicles, giving them certain
privileges due to the nature of their operations. Subsection (b) of Section 41-6-14 is merely a statement
that the exceptions granted to emergency vehicles
which grant them certain immunities from the rules
and regulations of the Vehicle Code do not give drivers
of emergency vehicles the right to ignore the basic
traffic rules with impunity. This section does not establish a standard of care for emergency vehicles, separate
and apart from the other provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code.

If we follow Appellant's reasoning and assume that

this subsection establishes the standard of care for
emergency vehicles and, therefore, precludes the guest
statute from applying, then we must also assume that
the guest statute would not apply to an automobile

8

approaching an intersection because Section 41-6-72
establishe.s a standard of care in such a sitution. Likewise, where a vehicle is making a left turn, to approaching a railroad crossing, or driving in canyons and on
mountain highways, Sections 41-6-73, 41-6-95, and 416-110, respectively, establish the duty and care to be
observed in these situations. It is apparent that these
sections, including 41-6-14, govern the relationships
between one vehicle and other vehicles, pedestrians, or
other objects which may utilize the public highways,
and not to the duties and obligations running from the
driver or owner of a vehicle to his passengers. Therefore, a guest statute, which applies to the latter relationships, can be read in conjunction with these other
sections and no conflict arises.
The guest statute applies to "any vehicle", which
necessarily includes ambulances. (See Section 41-1-1
(a), 41-2-1 (a), and 41-6-2 (a). Section 41-9-2 of the
guest statute further substantiates this by stating:
"For the purpose of this Section, the term
"guest" is hereby defined as being a person who
accepts a ride in any vehicle without giving compensation therefor." (Emphasis added)
In no place in any part of the Code is "vehicle" limited to exclude ambulances or any other emergency
vehicle. In no cases which Respondent has researched
has the distinction Appellant urges been upheld. In two
cases which have dealt with the issue, it has been held
that a patient riding in an ambulance can assume the
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status of guest regardless of whether or not an ambulance is an emergency vehicle. Leete v. Griswold Post
No. 79, American Legion, 144 Conn. 400, 158 Atl.
919 (1932) was a case with a fact situation almost
identical to the case at hand. In this case the Plaintiff
was being transported to a hospital by the defendant,
who maintained an ambulance to transport such members of the public as might need this service. The
ambulance driver went through a red light, collided
with a truck, and the plaintiff suffered additional injuries and shock. No charge was made and the defendand did not usually bill the patient. However, the
passengers often donated to the fund devoted to the
maintenance of such an ambulance. The Connecticut
court found that the plaintiff was a guest in the ambulance and not a passenger under this fact situation. Also,
in Hernandez v. Castillo, 303 SW 2nd 509 (TEX.
CIV. APP.), amended 309 S'V 2nd 938 (TEX. CIV.
APP.) , the court found that the injured passenger
was a guest, specifically rejecting the contention that
the ambulance was exempt from the operation of the
guest statute, and denied liability, holding that the
ambulance driver was not guilty of gross negligence
in driving a main thoroughfare against the red light.
Enough on Appellant's second point.
POINT III
THE UTAH GUEST STATUTE DOES APPLY TO AMUULANCES AND IN THIS CASE
10

SPECIFICALLY APPLIES AS THE KENNECOTT AMBULANCE WAS NOT A VEHICLE
FOR HIRE.
Appellant cites Jensen v.
4 Utah 2d 336,
294 P. 2d 683 ( 1956), in support of his contention
that the Kennecott ambulance was a vehicle for hire
and thus the guest statute should not apply. A careful reading of this case will show that it does not support
the Appellant's contention on this point, but rather is
contrary thereto. The court makes it clear that the
relationship in the l\!Iower case is basically a business
one. Defendant had advertised for riders at a stated
rate of compensation, and plaintiff had accepted the
offer. It is interesting that the defendant charged the
same rate as the bus for the same service, and required
that the fare be paid if the car went, whether or not
the plaintiff rode. The court makes it quite clear that
the basis of the decision rested on this business relationship. At page 687 of the Pacific citation, the court said:
"Appellant made it crystal clear that if the
respondent rode with him it would be on the
terms named by appellant for the price he named,
and if respondent didn't like it, he knew what he
could do."
Further down on the same page, the court stated:
"'Ve know of no reason why this driver, who
quoted a price not less than the bus fare, and
induced a rider to take passage, and who injured
the rider through his negligence, should be permitted to exonerate himself by pleading that he
didn't charge enough."
11

The Utah cases, including Mower, are unanimous
in holding that just any consideration for the ride is
not sufficient to remove the passenger from the guest
statute. The payment of consideration must be the main
inducement to the driver. See Smith vs. Franklin, 14
Utah 2d 16, 376 P. 2d 541 (1962), Greenhalgh v.
Green, 16 Utah 221, 398 P. 2d 691 ( 1965).
In Mower, supra, the case relied on to support
Appellant's contention, the court states at page 687
of the Pacific citation:
" . . . the cases turn not on whether money is
received or paid as a result of carrying the rider,
but upon the fact that the money or other consideration was given to the driver, not as a gratuity or in appreciation, but rather as an inducement for making the trip for the rider or furnishing carriage for the ride. If the driver extends the courtesy of a ride to a friend without
more or takes on a hiker overtaken on the highway, the status of guest in either case is not
replaced by that of passenger if gas is purchased,
meals purchased or cash given to assist the driver
in meeting the expenses of the trip. Such rider
is not in the car because of any compensation or
payment which induced the driver to give the
ride."
In Smith v. Franklin, supra, a case subsequent to
the l\'.lower case, the court said:
"Neither the giving of just any compensation
which might be some inconsequential amount of
money or other consideration of value, nor even
the sharing of expenses merely in social recipro-

12

cation for the ride would change the relationship (from guest) to that of passenger for hire.
Therefore, it would have to be sufficient
money or other thing of value that it could reasonably be supposed that the party so regarded
it (as compensation for the ride)."
In the Greenhalgh case, supra, the court affirmed
the granting of summary judgment against the plaintiff,
stating:
"The fact that a passenger pays traveling expenses as an act of social reciprocation, courtesy
or amenity does not make a paying passenger,
one who otherwise might be a guest."
The plaintiff in the Greenhalgh case urged precisely the point Plaintiff urges in the case at hand,
and the court specifically rejected this contention and
properly limited the scope of the l\'Iower case to the
particular fact situation where payment is a primary
inducement for the ride.
Appellant also urges that the cases applying the
guest statute do so only when a particular relationship
between the driver and passenger exists. This contention is unsupported by the evidence, as in no case does
the court make such a distinction. On the contrary,
in the case of Stack v. Kearns, ll8 Utah 237, 221 P.
2d 594 ( 1950), cited by the Plaintiff, and admitted by
him to be a case where relative strangers were involved,
the guest status of the passenger is never questioned
by the court but is assumed to exist throughout the
opinion. The question at issue there was whether or

13

not the defendant had exhibited the degree of negligence required under the guest statute to allow the
plaintiff to recover. The quotation last cited above in
the Mower case also repudiates Appellant's contention
as the court said :
"If the driver extends the courtesy of a ride to
a friend without more or takes on a hiker overtaken on the highway, the status of a guest ...
is not replaced . . . "
Surely the court did not expect that a hiker overtaken on a highway would necessarily be a relative or
a friend.
From the unfounded assumption that a guest
statute is applied only where certain relationships exist,
the Appellant concludes that the purpose of the guest
statute is to preclude the possibility of collusive suits
among friends or relatives. Respondent will not deny
that this may have been one factor in its passage, although no Utah case expresses this concern; however,
defendant denies that this was the major reason for
its passage or even of substantial concern in the minds
of either the legislators or the courts. On the contrary,
the Mower case, supra, states at page 686:
"It is our opinion that in the adoption of this
statute, the legislature sought to relieve the hardship which is visited upon a generous driver who
is sued by an invited rider for ordinary negligence of the driver when the rider gave
to compensate the driver for the transportation.'

'Vith this purpose in mind, the court should find

14

the guest statute applicable in the case at hand. For
these reasons, Appellant's third point must fail.

POINT IV
THE UTAH GUEST ST AT UTE BARS
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY HEREIN AND
PLAINTIFF-.'S RIDING WITHIN THE AMBULANCE WAS IN AND OF ITSELF SUFFICIENT ACCEPTANCE UNDER THE STATUTE.
Appellant argues that a literal and exact compliance with the language of the statute is required here,
but gives no authority to support this presumption.
There is ample authority that "acceptance" does not
require oral or written communication, and even that
non-action, or not denying a presumed acceptance will
be construed as acceptance if such a
is
reasonable. We assume that Appellant's point here is
that Appellant was so legally incapacitated by the one
shot of Demerol as to make him legally incompetent
to make such acceptance, much the same as the minor,
the mentally insane, and other legal incompetents cannot give consent to do certain things under the law.
Respondent, of course, denied that one shot of Demerol
would have such an incapacitating effect on the Appellant, and contends that this issue should be decided
against Appellant as not being a material issue of fact.
Appellant did enter the ambulance, even if he was somewhat disabled, and it was reasonable to assume that

15

the Appellant would accept the ride were he able to
do so under the circumstances. He should be estopped
from denying acceptance. To say that one in such
emergency situations cannot accept a ride and, therefore cannot become a guest would put a terrific burden
on those who offer assistance in emergency cases and
would clearly violate the purpose of the guest statute.
However, to avoid any possibility of finding that Appellant's fourth point raises an issue of fact, Respondent
contends that Appellant assumed the status of a guest
in this situation, even if he was incapacitated to the
extent that he could not legally accept the off er to ride
in the ambulance. The case of Favatella v. Poulson,
17 Utah to 24, 403 P. 2d 918 ( 1965), is in point on
this issue and should decide the point. The argument
made in the Favatella case was that a minor could
not legally give consent and, therefore, could not accept
the ride and become a guest. Appellant in the case at
hand argues that he could not give consent and thus
could not accept the ride and become a guest. The court
in the Favatella case decided that the parent, as guardian of the child, could give consent for the child. It
should be remembered that in the case at hand the
Appellant's uncle, who was also his superior on the job,
transported him to the emergency station and also
accompanied him in the ambulance on the trip to Salt
Lake. (R 23-24) If Appellant became incapacitated,
it was natural and reasonable that the uncle should
become legally responsible-both as a relative and as
a superior on the job involved when the accident oc-
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curred-and could thereby give the necessary consent.
Certainly Appellant will not allege that the uncle refused the ride in behalf of the Appellant. To hold that an
incompetent cannot accept a ride, and, therefore, cannot
become a guest under the guest statute would do violence to the guest statute and the purpose for which
it was enacted. Therefore, Appellant's fourth point must
also be rejected.
POINT V
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BELOW WAS CORRECT BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AS THEY
WERETAKENFORTHEPURPOSEOFTHE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
Appellant has in his point V raised some questions
that he feels are facts that remain to be determined
and claims that Summary Judgment should not have
been granted because those facts were in dispute at
this point. For the purpose of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Respondents agreed that the allegations of negligence as claimed by the Appellant
would be taken as true. It was also agreed that for the
purpose of the motion for Summary Judgment the
court should assume that the Appellant would have
been charged $7.50 for transportation in the ambulance. With those facts being agreed as undisputed
for the purpose of the Motion for Summary Judgment
and the evidence of the Appellant's accepting the ride
17

as found in the deposition_s, nevertheless, the court
below properly concluded that the Utah Guest Statute
did prevent a recovery by Plaintiff as against the Defendants in this case. (R 103 Willden Depo. 20-22).

CONCLUSION
The Respondent's l\lotion for Summary Judgment
was properly granted by the court below. The Appellant has not established any material
of fact
which may exist in the case at hand in relation to
the question regarding the applicability of the guest
statute. As argued herein, under Utah law, the guest
statute applies to all vehicles including ambulances.
A passenger is exempted from the operation of the
guest statute only if consideration i13 given and if that
consideration was the primary inducement for the ride.
In the instant case the court below concluded and we
urge that it is clear that even had the sum of $7.50
been charged the Appellant by Kennecott Copper it is
obvious that the charging of said amount was not the
inducement for Kennecott to provide transportation
for the Appellant. It becomes a matter of common
knowledge that Kennecott cannot operate its ambulance together with a driver and a medical attendant
from Bingham Canyon to the University of Utah hospital for the sum of $7.50. They not only could not
operate at that price but in fact would undoubtedly
have been losing money.
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It has also been shown that acceptance was given
by the Plaintiff or his uncle or both and that to hold
otherwise would violate the purpose of the guest statute.
It is defendant's contention that the case at hand
falls squarely within the provisions of the Utah Guest
Statute and therefore the standard of care applicable
is governed by the statute. The degree of negligence
alleged by the Appellant is not sufficient to meet the
requirement of gross negligence or willful misconduct
and the decision of the trial court should therefore be
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, IVERSON & TAYLOR
Richard H. Moffat
Attorney for Respondents,
Kennecott Copper Corporation and
Lee Cecil Hansen
1311 Walker Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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